Lesher v. Stewart
DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h).
Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: 52040-7-I
Title of Case: Janet Lesher, Respondent v. Steven Stewart
and Jane Doe Stewart, Appellants
File Date: 11/22/2004
SOURCE OF APPEAL
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Appeal from Superior Court of King County
Docket No: 01-2-11431-0
Judgment or order under review
Date filed: 01/21/2003
Judge signing: Hon. Terry Lukens
JUDGES
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Authored by Marlin J. Appelwick
Concurring: C. Kenneth Grosse
Faye C. Kennedy
COUNSEL OF RECORD
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Counsel for Appellant(s)
Marilee C. Erickson
Reed McClure
Two Union Square
601 Union St Ste 1500
Seattle, WA 98101-1363
Counsel for Respondent(s)
Peter Malden Brown
Dawson Brown PS
1000 2nd Ave Ste 1420
Seattle, WA 98104-1033
Kenneth Wendell Masters
Attorney at Law
241 Madison Ave N
Bainbridge Island, WA 98110-1811
Christopher Cyrus Pence
Law Offices of Christopher Pence PLLC
1111 3rd Ave Ste 3400
Seattle, WA 98101-3264
Charles Kenneth Wiggins
Attorney at Law
241 Madison Ave N
Bainbridge Island, WA 98110-1811
Counsel for Respondent Intervenor(s)
David Lawrence Hennings
Wilson Smith Cochran Dickerson
1215 4th Ave Ste 1700
Seattle, WA 98161-1010
Martha E. Raymond
Wilson Smith Cochran Dickerson
1215 4th Ave Ste 1700
Seattle, WA 98161-1010
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JANET LESHER, ) ) NO. 52040-
7-I
Respondent, ) ) DIVISION ONE
v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DYAN MURPHY and JOHN DOE )
MURPHY, wife and husband, )
)
Defendants, )
)
and )
)
STEVEN STUART. and JANE DOE )
STUART, husband and wife, ) FILED: November 22, 2004
)
Appellants. )
APPELWICK, J. - Janet Lesher suffered neck injuries in two unrelated car
accidents. About a year after the second accident, Lesher needed neck and
back surgery. She brought suit against both drivers, and settled with the
first driver. She prevailed in a jury trial against the second driver,
Steven Stewart. Stewart appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by
refusing to admit evidence, by refusing to allocate fault, by determining
proximate cause as a matter of law, by providing the jury with erroneous
instructions, and by allowing prejudicial statements during closing
arguments. We affirm.
FACTS
Lesher was rear-ended in two unrelated motor vehicle accidents. The
first accident occurred on November 5, 1998, between Dyan Murphy and
Lesher. The second accident occurred on January 26, 1999, between Stewart
and Lesher. Lesher was not at fault in either accident.
Following the November 1998 accident, Lesher suffered pain in her
neck, back, shoulders, and ribs. Her family doctor, Dr. Fleming,
prescribed muscle relaxants, anti-inflammatories, and physical therapy.
Lesher was still symptomatic at the time of the January 1999 accident, in
which Stewart rear-ended Lesher's car at a stop light. Following the
January 1999 accident, Dr. Fleming again prescribed muscle relaxants and
anti-inflammatories for Lesher. Two days later, Dr. Fleming diagnosed
Lesher with a hyperflexion injury to her neck muscles. He later also
diagnosed Lesher with a concussion based on her complaints of dizziness and
an inability to concentrate.
In July 1999, Lesher fell off of her bike, hitting her side, hand, hip
and shoulder. She visited the emergency room, but did not complain to the
emergency room doctors that she had hurt her back or her neck when she fell
from her bike.
The neck pain which Lesher began experiencing following her two car
accidents steadily worsened through the fall of 1999. Dr. Fleming referred
her to a specialist, Dr. Nutter, who ordered a magnetic resonance imaging
test (MRI). The MRI revealed that Lesher had two herniated disks. Upon
Dr. Nutter's recommendation, Lesher visited Dr. Klein, a neurosurgeon, who
recommended surgery to fuse the vertebrae surrounding the herniated disks.
Lesher sought the opinion of two other neurosurgeons, both of whom also
recommended surgery. In April 2000, Dr. Michael Calhoun (Dr. Calhoun)
fused the disks between Lesher's fifth and sixth, and sixth and seventh,
vertebrae. As a result of the surgery, Lesher's neck mobility is limited
and she continues to suffer pain and stiffness in her neck. Lesher brought
suit against Murphy and Stewart. Lesher and Murphy settled prior to trial.
Dr. James Green (Dr. Green), Stewart's orthopedic surgeon expert
witness, and two plaintiff medical doctors testified at trial. Based on
his CR 35 examination of Lesher, Dr. Green concluded that Lesher had
suffered mild cervical muscle strains from the November and January
accidents. He did not dispute that Lesher required surgery for her
herniated disks. Dr. Green testified that Lesher's herniated disks were
the result of progressive degeneration. The two car accidents, he stated,
'were two of many things that contributed ultimately to the degenerative
process. But there wasn't any documentation or awareness of how
significantly those disks were changed by the accidents except to say that
the disks didn't rupture at that time.' According to Dr. Green, Lesher's
condition was 'the result of all the stresses put on her neck, including
whatever happened in these two accidents and including whatever happened at
the time of the bicycle accident she had after the two accidents.'
Dr. Fleming, Lesher's family doctor, testified that the most common
injury in a rear-end accident is a hyperflexion injury to the muscles, and
that the mechanism for injury in such cases is a 'sudden, violent stretch
of the muscle fibers.' Dr. Fleming also stated that a concussion results
from 'sudden deceleration' which causes 'the brain {to} continue to move
and can actually strike the - in this case, the frontal portion of the
brain.' He further explained that Lesher's concussion indicated there was
significant, not trivial, force in the January 1999 accident, and that a
trivial impact would not have caused a concussion.
Dr. Calhoun, the surgeon who performed Lesher's fusion operation, testified
that both accidents caused Lesher's disc herniations because they injured
the disks, even though the herniations themselves did not develop until
later. He also testified that he could not delineate between the two
accidents and that each accident equally contributed to Lesher's injuries.
Before trial, Lesher filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony
of Paul Moore (Moore), Stewart's mechanical reconstructionist, and any
introduction or reference to photographs of Lesher's car, or damages
estimates of Lesher's vehicle, 'in the absence of qualified expert
testimony relating them' to Lesher's injuries.1 Moore had studied both
accidents, and planned to testify that the second accident caused only a
low and insignificant impact. Moore also planned to display and explain
photographs of Lesher's and Stewart's vehicles, which showed they sustained
minimal damage. The trial court excluded Moore's testimony and the
photographs.
During trial, Stewart renewed his motion to introduce evidence about
the severity of the impact. The trial court denied his motion.
The trial court also removed the issue of proximate cause from the
jury, providing the following jury instruction:
You are instructed that the collisions of November 5, 1998 and January 26,
1999 were each one proximate cause of plaintiff's disc {sic} herniations.
The trial court also did not give the jury Stewart's proposed instruction
on fault allocation.
During Lesher's closing, her counsel argued that 'the reason the case
had reached the point it had, and why all the parties had just spent the
past several days in court, was because, unlike the co-defendant Murphy,
who had settled, Mr. Stewart failed to settle his case when he had the
opportunity.' The court sustained Stewart's objection to the statement.
The jury returned a verdict awarding Lesher approximately $550,000.
Stewart filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
Stewart appeals.
II. Proximate cause
Stewart asserts that Jury Instruction No. 6 was in error because it
improperly directed a verdict on proximate cause.
We review challenged jury instructions de novo. State v. Davis, 116 Wn.
App. 81, 90, 64 P.3d 661 (2003). 'Instructions are sufficient if they
properly inform jurors of the applicable law, are not misleading, and
permit each party to argue his or her theory of the case.' Davis, 116 Wn.
App. at 90. The question of proximate cause is generally an issue of fact
for the jury to decide. Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wn.2d 265, 275, 979
P.2d 400 (1999). A court may enter judgment as a matter of law if the
evidence or reasonable inference from the evidence leads to one conclusion.
Miller v. Payless Drug Stores, Inc., 61 Wn.2d 651, 653, 379 P.2d 932
(1963).
The trial court determined that 'as a matter of law,' the January accident
was 'a' proximate cause of Lesher's injuries. Accordingly, the trial court
issued Jury Instruction No. 6, which stated:
You are instructed that the collisions of November 5, 1998 and January 26,
1999 were each one proximate cause of plaintiff's disc {sic} herniations.
The record supports the trial court's decision to give Jury
Instruction No. 6. Dr. Fleming, Dr. Calhoun, and Dr. Green all testified
that both the November 1998 and the January 1999 accidents contributed to
Lesher's injuries.
Dr. Fleming testified:
I do not believe there is any medical basis to distinguish between the two
accidents as to the relative contribution either made to Ms. Lesher{'s}
disc herniations.
Dr. Calhoun testified that:
{B}oth motor vehicle accidents combined to cause the disc herniation I
personally cannot delineate between the two accidents as to what is the
cause and would consider them equally the cause.
Similarly, Dr. Green, Stewart's expert medical witness, stated there was no
medical basis to apportion between the two accidents the amount of their
respective contribution to Lesher's injuries. Asked if he thought any
doctor could apportion the fault, Dr. Green replied 'Not logically.' Thus,
even Stewart's own medical expert agreed that segregation was not possible.
Stewart contends that although the evidence is undisputed that Lesher's
disks were herniated, the evidence as to how and why is disputed. To
support his assertion, Stewart points out that Dr. Calhoun admitted that
disk herniations can occur without any trauma, and that Dr. Green opined
that the disk herniations were the culmination of multiple stresses on
Lesher's neck over the course of time. Stewart reasons that, based on Dr.
Green's and Dr. Calhoun's testimony, the jury could have concluded that
Lesher would have developed herniated disks even if she had not been in two
accidents. Therefore, he asserts, the trial court erred in directing a
verdict on proximate cause.
Dr. Calhoun testified that disk herniations may occur even without
trauma, but he also testified that Lesher's accidents contributed to her
herniations. Jury Instruction No. 6 thus was not at odds with Dr.
Calhoun's testimony. And, although Dr. Green did opine that Lesher had a
degenerative disk condition, he also affirmatively stated that the two car
accidents were among the causes of Lesher's disk herniations. Jury
Instruction No. 6, in stating that the two collisions were each 'a'
proximate cause of Lesher's injuries, was thus faithful to Dr. Green's
testimony. Moreover, the trial court also took into consideration Dr.
Green's testimony in issuing Instruction 11, which stated that if the jury
found that Lesher suffered from a pre-existing condition, then it should
consider the extent to which the collisions aggravated the condition.
The undisputed evidence showed that the January 1999 accident was a
proximate cause of Lesher's injuries. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it removed the issue of proximate cause from the jury.
II. Attorney Fees Under CR 37(c)
Stewart also assigns error to the trial court's award of CR 37(c) fees
to Lesher. Lesher contends that she was entitled to fees under CR 37(c)
because Stewart refused to admit that the January 1999 accident was a cause
of her injuries even though his own medical expert testified that the
accident was a cause of Lesher's injuries.
This court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny fees
under CR 37(c) under an abuse of discretion standard Willener v.
Sweeting, 107 Wn.2d 388, 397-98, 730 P.2d 45 (1986).
CR 37(c) provides:
If a party fails to admit the truth of any matter as requested under CR
36, and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the . . .
truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order requiring the
other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making that
proof, including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the order
unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to
rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance,
or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe the fact
was not true or the document was not genuine, or (4) there was other good
reason for the failure to admit.
The purpose of CR 37(c) is to eliminate from a case matters that are not
actually disputed. Levy v. North American Co. for Life and Health Ins., 90
Wn.2d 846, 855, 586 P.2d 845 (1978). Thus, a party must admit an issue,
even if central to his case, if he will not dispute the issue at trial.
Levy, 90 Wn.2d at 855.
Lesher filed a motion under CR 37(c) requesting $9,775.00 in attorney
fees and $17,005.00 in expenses 'incurred in proving the matters denied by
{Stewart} in plaintiff's Request for Admission No. 7.' Request for
Admission No. 7 required Stewart's admission that Lesher's disk herniations
resulted from the two accidents underlying the lawsuit. Stewart objected
that Admission No. 7 was 'beyond the scope of CR 36' and did not otherwise
answer the request.2 Initially, the trial court denied Lesher's motion for
CR 37(c) fees, but stated, '{n}othing in this order shall be deemed to
prevent plaintiff from seeking expenses under CR 37(c)' if causation was
proved at trial. Causation was proved at trial. Following the trial, the
trial court found that Stewart did not have reasonable grounds to deny the
request for admission, and awarded Lesher $5,912.50 in fees and $7,702.85
in costs under CR 37(c).
Stewart does not dispute that his witness, Dr. Green, in a deposition prior
to trial, admitted that the January 1999 accident was one of the causes of
Lesher's injuries. Nonetheless, Stewart denied Lesher's request for
admissions as to causation. At trial, Dr. Green reiterated his position
that the January 1999 accident was a cause of Lesher's injuries. The
record supports the trial court's conclusion that Stewart failed to admit
causation. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
awarded CR 37(c) fees to Lesher.
III. Exclusion of Evidence
Stewart asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it
excluded relevant evidence.
Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Davidson v.
Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 43 Wn. App. 569, 572, 719 P.2d 569 (1986).
A trial court abuses its discretion when discretion is exercised on
untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. Davidson, 43 Wn. App. at 572.
Facts that tend to establish a party's theory or disprove an opponent's
evidence are relevant and should be admitted. Fenimore v. Donald M. Drake
Constr. Co., 87 Wn.2d 85, 89, 549 P.2d 483 (1976). Excluding evidence that
prevents a party from presenting a crucial element of its case constitutes
reversible error. Grigsby v. City of Seattle, 12 Wn. App. 453, 457, 529
P.2d 1167 (1975).
Lesher filed a motion in limine to exclude Moore's testimony, the
photographs and repair records, arguing that the evidence was misleading
and irrelevant because Stewart had already admitted liability. At trial,
Stewart sought to have admitted into evidence: 1) his own testimony that
the impact of the January 1999 accident was not severe; 2) testimony from
his accident reconstruction specialist, Moore; and 3) photographs and
repair records for the cars involved.
Stewart argues on appeal that testimony from Lesher and her medical expert,
Dr. Fleming, opened the door to his proposed evidence by raising the notion
of force or impact.3 Dr. Fleming testified that there was a 'significant
force' in the January accident, that the accident was not a 'trivial
impact,' and that the force was significant enough to cause Lesher's
concussion. This evidence came in without objection from Stewart.
However, Stewart renewed his efforts to introduce Moore's testimony. Moore
would have testified that Stewart's car was traveling at about 2 mph. when
it rolled into Lesher's car.4
The trial court deliberated at length as to the relevance of Moore's
testimony on impact severity, asking:
How though {is it relevant}? I mean, how is the accident reconstructionist
able to say - I mean, you could have a situation where the car is
demolished, and the person gets up and walks out of it, and there's no
injuries at all. {I} don't know what the connection is . . . .
The trial judge also queried Stewart's counsel:
But there's no connection; is there? What's the connection? If there's a
tap on the rear-end, but it causes someone to be propelled forward, there
could be little or no damage, and they could still suffer injury. And
conversely, my other example, the car could be totaled, and they could walk
out with{out} a scratch. Which happens. So that's why I don't - on the
first question, I don't see how it bears any relationship other than an
argument that this accident couldn't have caused these injuries. When
that's not the issue; is it?
The trial court also weighed the benefit of Moore's impact testimony
against Dr. Fleming's testimony. Ultimately, the trial court applied ER
403 and found that:
{T}he prejudice of having {Stewart} testify that it was a light tap and
then having you argue from that is - in light of any sort of connection,
far outweighs whatever probative value it might have.
The trial court concluded that it would not admit evidence of either impact
severity or of Lesher's concussion. Because Lesher's counsel had mentioned
Lesher's concussion during opening, the trial court agreed to instruct
Lesher's counsel to make an affirmative statement during closing that she
was not seeking concussion damages. Stewart requested a limiting
instruction directing the jury to ignore the evidence regarding the
concussion. The trial court denied his request. In light of the direct
statement of Lesher's counsel that damages based on the concussion were not
being sought, we conclude the denial of the limiting instruction was within
the trial court's discretion.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Moore's
testimony.
IV. Apportionment
Stewart also assigns error to the trial court's refusal to instruct the
jury on allocation of fault.5
Lesher maintains that because Stewart did not specifically except to the
trial court's failure to give a jury instruction, he is precluded from
doing so on appeal under CR 51(f) which states:
Before instructing the jury, the court shall supply counsel with copies of
its proposed instructions which shall be numbered. Counsel shall then be
afforded an opportunity in the absence of the jury to make objections to
the giving of any instruction and to the refusal to give a requested
instruction. The objector shall state distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds of his objection, specifying the number, paragraph
or particular part of the instruction to be given or refused and to which
objection is made.
The purpose of CR 51(f) is to afford the trial court a chance to correct
mistakes in jury instructions before they are made. Blaney v. Int'l Ass'n.
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 114 Wn. App. 80, 85, 55 P.3d 1208
(2002).
While Stewart did not formally except to the jury instructions, he
preserved the issue by raising it in his motion in limine. CR 51(f) thus
does not deprive Stewart of an opportunity to raise the trial court's
failure to give jury instructions on this appeal. Accordingly, we address
Stewart's apportionment argument.
Jury instructions are sufficient if ''they allow the parties to argue their
theories of the case, do not mislead the jury and, when taken as a whole,
properly inform the jury of the law to be applied.' Cox v. Spangler, 141
Wn.2d 431, 442, 5 P.3d 1265 (2000) (quoting Hue v. Farmboy Spray Co. Inc.,
127 Wn.2d 67, 92, 896 P.2d 682 (1995)). 'On appeal, jury instructions are
reviewed de novo, and an instruction that contains an erroneous statement
of the applicable law is reversible error where it prejudices a party.'
Cox, 141 Wn.2d at 442.
At trial, Dr. Calhoun testified that he could not delineate between the two
accidents and that each accident equally contributed to Lesher's injuries.
Stewart asserted this supported a 50-50 allocation of fault. The trial
court disagreed with Stewart's assertion at trial that Dr. Calhoun's
testimony provided support for allocation of fault, and found that Dr.
Calhoun's testimony meant only that both accidents contributed to Lesher's
injuries. Dr. Green testified that Lesher's herniations 'were the result
of all the stresses put on her neck,' and that the interval between the two
accidents and Lesher's herniations was 'too long an interval to say that
this is the one incident that caused {the herniations}.' Based on
testimony from the medical experts, the trial court granted Lesher's motion
in limine to exclude Stewart's attempt to allocate or apportion fault.
At the close of trial, the trial court concluded that fault could not be
apportioned and refused to give Stewart's proposed Jury Instruction No. 13,
and his proposed special verdict form on the allocation of fault. Proposed
Jury Instruction No. 13 stated:
In an action involving the negligence of more than one entity, you must
determine what percentage of the total negligence is attributable to each
entity which proximately caused the damage to the plaintiff. The court
will provide you with a special verdict form for this purpose.
Entities may include the defendants or entities not party to this action.
Your answer to the questions in the special verdict form will furnish the
basis by which the court will apportion damages, if any, among the
defendants.
Stewart asserts that Washington's Tort Reform Act, RCW 4.22.070, is
governing, and that under that statute, liability must be apportioned.6
'RCW 4.22.070, the centerpiece of the 1986 amendatory package, requires all
liability be apportioned unless a listed exception applies in which case
joint and several liability is retained.' Kottler v. State, 136 Wn.2d 437,
443, 963 P.2d 834 (1998). RCW 4.22.070 'generally abolishes joint and
several liability', retaining it in only three areas. Kottler, 136 Wn.2d
at 446. Two of these exceptions are irrelevant to this case.7 We analyze
whether the third exception, codified at RCW 4.22.070(1)(b) applies here,
which states:
If the trier of fact determines that the claimant or party suffering bodily
injury or incurring property damages was not at fault, the defendants
against whom judgment is entered shall be jointly and severally liable for
the sum of their proportionate shares of the claimants {claimant's} total
damages.
Lesher was not at fault, so the relevant inquiry is whether 'defendants',
as used in RCW 4.22.070(1)(b), includes Murphy, the settling party. In
Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120 Wn.2d 246, 840 P.2d 860 (1992), the court
stated:
Under RCW 4.22.070(1)(b), only defendants against whom judgment is entered
are jointly and severally liable and only for the sum of their
proportionate shares of the total damages. A defendant against whom
judgment is entered is specifically defined by RCW 4.22.070(1) as 'each
defendant except those who have been released by the claimant or are immune
from liability to the claimant or have prevailed on any other individual
defense. ' Thus, settling, released defendants do not have judgment entered
against them within the meaning of RCW 4.22.070(1), and therefore are not
jointly and severally liable defendants.
Washburn, 120 Wn.2d at 294; Kottler, 136 Wn.2d at 447. Because Murphy was
a settling party, she could not be a jointly and severally liable defendant
under RCW 4.22.070(1)(b). Accordingly, without a co-defendant there is no
joint liability possible. Lesher's argument that Stewart was jointly and
severally liable under RCW 4.22.070(1)(b) is in error.
Under RCW 4.22.070, liability is to be apportioned. In Cox v.
Spangler, 141 Wn.2d 431, 5 P.3d 1265 (2000), the Court stated:
{O}nce a plaintiff has proved that each successive negligent defendant has
caused some damage, the burden of proving allocation of those damages among
themselves is upon the defendants; if the jury find{s} that the harm is
indivisible, then the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the
entire harm.
Cox, 141 Wn.2d at 443 (quoting Phennah v. Whalen, 28 Wn. App. 19, 29, 621
P.2d 1304 (1980)). In this case, because Lesher's injuries were
indivisible, under RCW 4.22.070 fault cannot be apportioned. This makes
RCW 4.22.070 inapplicable to the facts of this case. The relevant statute
is RCW 4.22.030, which states:
Except as otherwise provided in RCW 4.22.070, if more than one person is
liable to a claimant on an indivisible claim for the same injury, death or
harm, the liability of such persons shall be joint and several.
'Persons', as used in RCW 4.22.030, necessarily means defendants. '{O}ne
is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not
designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service
of process.' City of Seattle v. Fontanilla, 128 Wn.2d 492, 502, 909 P.2d
1294 (1996) (citations omitted). Although Murphy was a defendant, she had
already settled with Lesher, so judgment could not be entered against her.
Stewart cannot be liable jointly for the indivisible harm on the judgment
without a co-defendant. Under RCW 4.22.030, joint and several liability
means the sole defendant, Stewart, is severally liable for the indivisible
claim.
The trial court did not err when it refused to instruct the jury on
the allocation of fault.
V. Motion for New Trial
Stewart also asserts that he was denied a fair trial because (1)
Lesher's improper remarks at closing prejudiced him, and (2) the trial
court's admonishment of his attorney before the jury further prejudiced
him.
This court reviews a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.
Getzendaner v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 52 Wn.2d 61, 70, 322 P.2d 1089 (1958).
Stewart alleges that, during closing arguments, Lesher's counsel
stated that the reason all parties had spent several days in court was
because, unlike Murphy, who had settled, Stewart failed to settle when he
had the opportunity. Stewart requested a transcription of closing
arguments, for reasons not in the record the trial court did not order a
verbatim record of closing arguments. However, Lesher does not deny
Stewart's allegation. Stewart objected and the trial court sustained
Stewart's objection.
Stewart's claim that opposing counsel's statement prejudiced him is
based on notice to the jury that Murphy settled. However, the jury had
knowledge of the settlement because Jury Instruction No. 7 instructed the
jury that Lesher had
settled with Murphy.8 Stewart did not object to the instruction below, or
assign error to it on appeal. On the facts of this case, we find that the
statement of Lesher's counsel during closing was harmless error.
During closing, Stewart's counsel asserted that the case was a soft
tissue case and suggested a $4,000 to $6,000 range for general damages.
Lesher's counsel objected and requested a sidebar, arguing that Stewart's
counsel had made improper arguments contrary to the jury instructions.
Rather than requesting a mistrial, Lesher's counsel elected to have the
trial court judge address the jury. The trial judge informed the jury that
Stewart's counsel had improperly commented that the case was a soft tissue
case. The evidence of injury supports the trial court determination. The
trial court's comment to the jury merely clarified to the jury that the
case was not a soft tissue case. The comment did not impugn Stewart's
counsel. We find no error.
Affirmed.
/s/ Appelwick, J.
WE CONCUR:
/s/ Kennedy, J. /s/ Grosse, J.
.The correct spelling for Stewart will be used throughout this opinion.
1 Lesher also requested that the court exclude any opinions by Stewart's
medical expert, Dr. Green, or by Moore, 'if such opinions were not
expressed at their discovery depositions.'
2 CR 36 provides that '{a} party may serve upon any other party a written
request for the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the
truth of any matters within the scope of rule 26(b) set forth in the
request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application
of law to fact, { }.'CR 26(b) sets forth the scope of discovery, and states
that in general, '{p}arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party.'
3 Under the record citation Stewart quotes in his appellate brief, Lesher's
testimony that her head 'whipped back' and 'whipped forward' concerning her
November accident. Because this testimony does not concern her January
accident involving Stewart, we do not address it.
4 Stewart asserts that Ma'ele v. Arrington, 111 Wn. App. 557, 561, 45 P.3d
557 (2002) supports his position that Moore's testimony was admissible. In
Ma'ele, another vehicle accident case, the court allowed testimony from a
biomechanical engineer that the collision at issue was too trivial to have
caused the plaintiff's injuries. The expert's testimony went toward
whether the accident caused the plaintiff's injuries. Ma'ele, 111 Wn. App.
at 561-62. Ma'ele is distinguishable. Whereas in Ma'ele causation had not
yet been established, here, causation was established.
5 RCW 4.22.015 defines fault as including 'acts or omissions, including
misuse of a product, that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward
the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to
strict tort liability or liability on a product liability claim. The term
also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk, and
unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages.
6 RCW 4.22.070 in entirety states:
(1) In all actions involving fault of more than one entity, the trier of
fact shall determine the percentage of the total fault which is
attributable to every entity which caused the claimant's damages, except
entities immune from liability to the claimant under Title 51 RCW. The sum
of the percentages of the total fault attributed to at-fault entities shall
equal one hundred percent. The entities whose fault shall be determined
include the claimant or person suffering personal injury or incurring
property damage, defendants, third-party defendants, entities released by
the claimant, entities with any other individual defense against the
claimant, and entities immune from liability to the claimant, but shall not
include those entities immune from liability to the claimant under Title 51
RCW. Judgment shall be entered against each defendant except those who have
been released by the claimant or are immune from liability to the claimant
or have prevailed on any other individual defense against the claimant in
an amount which represents that party's proportionate share of the
claimant's total damages. The liability of each defendant shall be several
only and shall not be joint except:
(a) A party shall be responsible for the fault of another person or for
payment of the proportionate share of another party where both were acting
in concert or when a person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.
(b) If the trier of fact determines that the claimant or party suffering
bodily injury or incurring property damages was not at fault, the
defendants against whom judgment is entered shall be jointly and severally
liable for the sum of their proportionate shares of the claimants
{claimant's} total damages.
(2) If a defendant is jointly and severally liable under one of the
exceptions listed in subsections (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this section, such
defendant's rights to contribution against another jointly and severally
liable defendant, and the effect of settlement by either such defendant,
shall be determined under RCW 4.22.040, 4.22.050, and 4.22.060.
(3)(a) Nothing in this section affects any cause of action relating to
hazardous wastes or substances or solid waste disposal sites.
(b) Nothing in this section shall affect a cause of action arising from the
tortious interference with contracts or business relations.
(c) Nothing in this section shall affect any cause of action arising from
the manufacture or marketing of a fungible product in a generic form which
contains no clearly identifiable shape, color, or marking.
7 First, modified joint and several liability is retained where the
negligent parties were acting in concert or where there was a
master/servant or principal/agent relationship at play. RCW
4.22.070(1)(a).
Second, full joint and several liability remains the rule in cases
involving hazardous waste, tortious interference with business, and
unmarked fungible goods such as asbestos. RCW 4.22.070(3)(a)-(c).
Kotter, 136 Wn.2d at 446.
8 Instruction No. 7 states:
Plaintiff Lesher and defendant Dyan Murphy have entered into a settlement
agreement and Murphy has been dismissed from this lawsuit. You are not to
speculate regarding the amount, terms, or effect of this settlement
agreement. Your duty is to determine the full amount of plaintiff Lesher's
injuries and damages proximately caused by the two automobile collisions
pursuant to these instructions, without regard to the Murphy settlement.