Brand v. Department of Labor & Industries
Supreme Court of the State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: 67319-5
Title of Case: Catherine Brand
v.
Department of Labor & Industries
File Date: 12/16/1999
Oral Argument Date: 05/27/1999
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Superior Court,
Pierce County;
93-2-02791-1
Honorable Grant L. Anderson, Judge.
JUSTICES
--------
Authored by Barbara A. Madsen
Concurring: Charles Z. Smith
Charles W. Johnson
Richard B. Sanders
Faith E Ireland
Philip A. Talmadge
Gerry L. Alexander
Richard P. Guy
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
Charles K. Wiggins
Attorney At Law
241 Madison Ave N
Bainbridge Is, WA 98110
Christine A. Foster
Foster & Associates, Psc
1411 Fourth Ave. #1130
Seattle, WA 98101
Michael S. Lind
David B. Vail & Associates
819 Mlk Way Po Box 5707
Tacoma, WA 98415
Counsel for Respondent(s)
Martha P. Lantz
Atny Gen Offc/Labor & Ind
PO Box 40121
Olympia, WA 98504-0121
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Trial Lawyers Assoc
Bryan P. Harnetiaux
517 E 17th Ave
Spokane, WA 99203-2210
Michael J. Pontarolo
Delay Curran Thompson & Pontarolo
601 West Main Avenue
Suite 1212
Spokane, WA 99201-0605
Gary N. Bloom
Harbaugh & Bloom
P.O. Box 1461
Spokane, WA 99210
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
CATHERINE BRAND, ) No. 67319-5
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) EN BANC
)
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND )
INDUSTRIES OF THE STATE OF )
WASHINGTON, )
)
Respondent. )
) Filed: December 16, 1999
MADSEN, J. Catherine Brand seeks review of a published Court of Appeals
decision ordering a reduction and recalculation of the attorney fees
awarded to her in a workers' compensation case. Brand argues that an award
of attorney fees under RCW 51.52.130 should be calculated without regard to
the worker's overall recovery on appeal, and should not exclude fees for
work done on
unsuccessful claims. We agree, and hold that attorney fees awarded under
RCW 51.52.130 should not be limited by the worker's degree of success.
However, we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the trial
court failed to make adequate written findings justifying the award of
attorney fees in this case. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to
make specific findings regarding the attorney fees award in a manner
consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
Catherine Brand injured her left knee in 1978 while working as an
assistant manager at the Sherwood Apartments. The Department of Labor and
Industries (Department) found her injury to be work related and,
accordingly, granted Brand's workers' compensation claim. Over the course
of the next few years, Brand underwent seven knee surgeries and received
physical therapy. In 1991, the Department closed Brand's claim on the
basis that treatment was no longer necessary and there was no additional
permanent partial disability.
Ms. Brand then appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals
(Board). The Board found that, as of 1992, Brand's knee condition was
fixed and stable, and she would not benefit from any further curative
treatment. The Board affirmed the Department's award for a permanent
partial impairment of 30 percent of the value of the left lower leg. In
addition to Brand's knee injury, the Board
determined that Ms. Brand suffered from a "Category 1"1 low back strain
that was causally related to her knee injury. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 83.
Ms. Brand appealed the Board's decision to the Superior Court,
claiming to be totally disabled and incapable of gainful employment. In
the alternative, Brand asserted that the partial disabilities to her knee
and back were more severe than the Board and Department had found. Ms.
Brand sought $113,583 in pension benefits and/or additional time-loss
compensation.
The jury affirmed the Board's finding that Brand was not totally
permanently disabled and did not need further treatment for either her knee
or back. Additionally, the jury rejected Brand's argument that she was
temporarily disabled between May 1987 and October 1990 and between May 1991
and January 1992. However, the jury disagreed with the Board's assessment
of the degree of Brand's injury. The jury increased Ms. Brand's partial
disability award for her knee from 30 percent to 40 percent and her low
back injury from category one to category two.2 The verdict resulted in a
one-time benefit for Ms. Brand in the amount of $3,120.
Ms. Brand's attorneys requested attorney fees under RCW 51.52.130,
which provides that the court shall fix a reasonable fees for the services
of a worker's attorney if the Board's decision is reversed or modified and
additional relief is granted to the worker on appeal. RCW 51.52.130.
Tacoma attorney David Vail, Ms. Brand's first attorney who represented
Brand before the agency and prepared her case for trial, claimed 42.85
hours at $200 an hour for himself and 17.5 hours at $125 for his associate,
for a total of $10,757.50. Christine Foster, Ms. Brand's Seattle attorney
who took over the case at trial, requested fees totaling $29,637.3
The trial court awarded Brand $25,000 in attorney fees, together with
$1,949.09 in taxable costs for legal services performed on all the issues
before the court. The court allocated $6,000 to Brand's first attorney,
and $19,000 to her second attorney. The trial court did not enter any
written findings or conclusions regarding the attorney fees award, but
provided this general explanation:
The total fee - and I'm going to split it out and just tell you where I
would come out - would be $25,000. And I would allocate 19,000 of that to
{Ms. Foster} and 6,000 of that to Mr. Vail, because even though he had time
sitting around in the courtroom, he in fact didn't do it, but turned it
over to {Ms. Foster} . . . .
Basically what I did - and I'll be honest with you. I tend to round
things off. I took your $185 an hour. You had 98.8 and you had 12 and a
half, and I just don't think that's all there. I took 100 hours at $185 an
hour. I put it at a little more than that. I came to 19,000. And like I
said, I rounded it.
On the other side, I went down. I took {Mr. Vail's associate} at less
than that, and I also reduced Mr. Vail's, when I did my initial
calculation, and I did that kind of arbitrarily. I did not put his full
hours in. But in any event, the hours would not have been more than $185
an hour. It would not have been more for him than any of the prevailing
trial attorneys.
Within the parameters of that, using his numbers, I put arbitrarily
$100 an hour for {Mr. Vail's associate} and I came out to a little over
10,000. I, frankly, reduced those, because of all the stand-around time
that was not productive time.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings (RP) (June 21, 1996) at 17-19.
When asked by the Department whether Ms. Brand could recovery attorney fees
for all issues, including those on which she failed to prevail, the trial
court responded: "On all issues, yes. I don't think that they have to win
on all of them to do it." RP (June 21, 1996) at 19. The Department
appealed the award of attorney fees.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a
recalculation of the attorney fees award. Brand v. Department of Labor &
Indus., 91 Wn. App. 280, 959 P.2d 133 (1998). According to the Court of
Appeals, the trial court's explanation of the basis for the attorney fees
award was inadequate and failed to contain detailed findings about the
hourly rate and total hours for each attorney. Id. at 293. On remand, the
Court of Appeals directed the trial court to consider Brand's "very limited
success at trial," and to segregate costs and fees attributable to Brand's
successful claims from those costs and fees attributable to Brand's
unsuccessful claims. Id. at 294, 297. The court concluded that any award
of attorney fees for the unsuccessful claims should be supported by reasons
included in the trial court's written findings. Id. at 297. Brand
petitioned for review.
Analysis
This court reviews the reasonableness of attorney fees awards under an
abuse of discretion standard. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v.
University of Wash., 114 Wn.2d 677, 688-89, 790 P.2d 604 (1990). "A trial
court does not abuse its discretion unless the exercise of its discretion
is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons."
Id. This court has overturned attorney fees awards when it has disapproved
of the basis or method used by the trial court, or when the record fails to
state a basis supporting the award. Id. (citing Boeing Co. v. Sierracin
Corp., 108 Wn.2d 38, 65, 738 P.2d 665 (1987)).
The trial court in this case awarded $25,000 in attorney fees to Brand
under RCW 51.52.130. The relevant portion of RCW 51.52.130 provides:
If, on appeal to the superior or appellate court from the decision and
order of the board, said decision and order is reversed or modified and
additional relief is granted to a worker or beneficiary . . . a reasonable
fee for the services of the worker's or beneficiary's attorney shall be
fixed by the court.
While RCW 51.52.130 does not distinguish between successful and
unsuccessful claims brought on appeal, the statute also does not specify
how the amount of attorney fees should be determined. Further, the statute
does not address the situation at issue here, where the Board's decision
was only partially reversed on appeal.
This court has previously applied the lodestar method when the fee
shifting statute at issue fails to indicate how the attorney fees award
should be calculated. Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn.2d
581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983). A court arrives at the lodestar award by
multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably
expended on the matter. Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 122 Wn.2d 141, 149-50,
859 P.2d 1210 (1993). The lodestar amount may be adjusted to account for
subjective factors such as the level of skill required by the litigation,
the amount of potential recovery, time limitations imposed by the
litigation, the attorney's reputation, and the undesirability of the case.
Bowers, 100 Wn.2d at 597. See also Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC)
1.5(a).
The amount of recovery may be a relevant consideration in determining the
reasonableness of a fee award, but is not conclusive. Mahler v. Szucs, 135
Wn.2d 398, 433, 957 P.2d 632, 966 P.2d 305 (1998); Travis v. Washington
Horse Breeders Ass'n Inc., 111 Wn.2d 396, 409-10, 759 P.2d 418 (1988). "We
will not overturn a large attorney fees award in civil litigation merely
because the amount at stake in the case is small." Mahler, 135 Wn.2d at
433. In the context of workers' compensation, this court has approved a
$300 award of attorney fees in a case in which the worker recovered only
$1,092, noting that, "{i}n these cases, the amount of recovery is but
little, if any, guide." Rehberger v. Department of Labor & Indus., 154
Wash. 659, 662, 283 P. 185 (1929).
Central to the calculation of an attorney fees award, however, is the
underlying purpose of the statute authorizing the attorney fees. This
court has recognized that specific statutes authorizing the award of
attorney fees may be designed to serve purposes other than the general
purpose of most fee shifting statutes: to punish frivolous litigation and
encourage meritorious litigation. Scott Fetzer Co., 122 Wn.2d at 149. For
example, in Scott Fetzer, this court recognized that the attorney fees
provision of the long-arm statute served the purpose of compensating out-of-
state defendants for their reasonable efforts while encouraging the
exercise of state jurisdiction. Id. Given that attorney fees statutes may
serve different purposes, it is important to evaluate the purpose of the
specific attorney fees provision and to apply the statute in accordance
with that purpose.
The purpose behind the award of attorney fees in workers' compensation
cases is to ensure adequate representation for injured workers who were
denied justice by the Department:
The very purpose of allowing an attorney's fee in industrial accident cases
primarily was designed to guarantee the injured workman adequate legal
representation in presenting his claim on appeal without incurring of legal
expense or the diminution of his award if ultimately granted for the
purpose of paying his counsel.
Harbor Plywood Corp. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 48 Wn.2d 553, 559,
295 P.2d 310 (1956) (quoting Boeing Aircraft Co. v. Department of Labor &
Indus., 26 Wn.2d 51, 173 P.2d 164, 167 (1946)); Rehberger, 154 Wash. at
662. The Legislature amended RCW 51.52.130 to strengthen the purpose of
providing representation for injured workers by allowing attorney fees
awards at the appellate court as well as the superior court, and allowing
fees when the worker successfully defends against the Board's appeal. Laws
of 1993, ch. 122, sec. 1.4
The statutory scheme of the Industrial Insurance Act, Title 51 RCW, as a
whole is also instructive. Unlike other statutes, the Industrial Insurance
Act is a self-contained system that provides specific procedures and
remedies for injured workers. Under the act, the Washington Legislature,
recognizing the importance of the worker to the state, created a system to
provide swift and certain compensation for workers injured on the job. In
exchange for this guaranteed compensation, the injured worker gives up her
right to other legal remedies for her injury:
The state of Washington . . . declares that all phases of the premises are
withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for
workers, injured in their work, and their families and dependents is hereby
provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every
other remedy, proceeding or compensation . . . and to that end all civil
actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all
jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby
abolished.
RCW 51.04.010. This "grand compromise," Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wn.2d
853, 859, 904 P.2d 278 (1995), operates as a quid pro quo in which both
employers and employees exchange procedural and substantive rights for an
ordered system of certain compensation without regard to fault.
Consistent with the legislative intent behind the Industrial Insurance Act,
this court has repeatedly emphasized that the Industrial Insurance Act
should be given a liberal interpretation. The act "is remedial in nature
and is to be liberally applied to achieve its purpose of providing
compensation to all covered persons injured in their employment." Sacred
Heart Med. Ctr. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 92 Wn.2d 631, 635, 600
P.2d 1015 (1979); Johnson v. Tradewell Stores, Inc., 95 Wn.2d 739, 743, 630
P.2d 441 (1981); Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 134 Wn.2d 795, 799, 953 P.2d
800 (1998). In considering the calculation of attorney fees under RCW
51.52.130, we should attempt to give effect to the underlying purpose of
RCW 51.52.130 specifically, the Industrial Insurance Act as a whole, and
this court's previous interpretations of the act.
We turn now to the Department's specific arguments. The Department
concedes that Brand is entitled to attorney fees, but contends that the
amount awarded by the trial court was unreasonable. The Department points
out that the trial court awarded Brand an additional $3,120 on appeal, but
rejected her claim for total disability, which would have entitled her to a
pension worth $113,583. The Department argues that the amount of attorney
fees awarded should have been reduced in light of Brand's relatively small
overall recovery. The Department also asserts that the trial court erred
in awarding Brand attorney fees attributable to work on her unsuccessful
claims.
The statute, by its plain language, sets the criteria for a worker to
receive attorney fees: the Board's decision must be reversed or modified
and additional relief granted to the worker. The worker's success is
measured only by the reversal or modification of the Board's decision.
Nothing in the language of RCW 51.52.130 suggests that the award of
attorney fees is dependent upon the worker's overall success on appeal.
Nor is there any evidence that the Legislature intended to limit attorney
fees to those attributable to successful claims, or to reduce the award
when the worker receives little overall financial relief.
In contrast to RCW 51.52.130, which contains no express limitation on
the award of reasonable attorney fees for workers who prevail on appeal
before the superior court, other sections of the Industrial Insurance Act
specifically limit attorney fee awards. For example, RCW 51.52.120(1)
limits attorney fees awarded for a worker who prevails before the
Department to "thirty percent of the increase in the award secured by the
attorney's services." Similarly, RCW 51.52.120(2) discusses the award of
attorney fees for workers who prevail before the Board, and directs the
Board to fix the amount, taking into consideration the fees allowed for
services before the Department. In contrast, the Legislature placed no
specific limit on the award of attorney fees for work done before the
superior or appellate courts. RCW 51.52.130. Instead, the award is left
to the discretion of the court.5 Where the Legislature has expressly
limited fees available at one phase of the proceedings, it is unlikely that
the Legislature intended to limit fees awards at the other phases without
expressly enumerating those limitations. This is in keeping with "the
judicial doctrine expressio unius est exclusio alterius: the expression of
one is the exclusion of the other." Landmark Dev., Inc. v. City of Roy,
138 Wn.2d 561, 571, 980 P.2d 1234 (1999).
In light of the plain language of RCW 51.52.130, we hold that reducing
attorney fees awards to account for a worker's limited success is
inappropriate in this context. Under the statute, the worker's degree of
overall recovery is inconsequential. This holding is consistent with the
purposes behind RCW 51.52.130. Awarding full attorney fees to workers who
succeed on appeal before the superior or appellate court will ensure
adequate representation for injured workers.
Awarding attorney fees under RCW 51.52.130 without regard to the
worker's degree of success is also appropriate in light of the general
purpose of the Industrial Insurance Act -- providing workers compensation
for their injuries. As Brand points out, compensation under the Industrial
Insurance Act is already reduced. Workers' compensation benefits are based
on a statutory schedule, rather than on the worker's actual losses. RCW
51.32. Since its inception, this court has recognized that the Industrial
Insurance Act offers relatively limited compensation to injured workers:
The Industrial Insurance Act is not one designed to award full compensation
to each individual for all such damages as such individual would be
entitled to in his peculiar circumstances, but is only a system of limited
insurance whereby all industrial employees within the statute are paid
definite but limited amounts for injuries without regard, as we have said,
to the particular individual circumstances or needs of the injured
employee.
Foster v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 107 Wash. 400, 402, 181 P. 912 (1919).
See also Diesso v. Department of Labor & Indus., 36 Wn.2d 58, 62, 216 P.2d
752 (1950).
Commentators have noted that limiting the amount of attorney fees awarded
in workers compensation cases is inconsistent with the general purpose of
the workers' compensation system. Obligating successful workers to cover
their legal costs reduces the worker's already limited recovery. As noted
in Larson's Workers' Compensation Law:
When, however, this practice {of obligating the worker to cover her own
legal costs} is superimposed upon a closely calculated system of wage-loss
benefits, a serious question arises whether the social objectives of the
legislation may to some extent be thwarted. The benefit scales are so
tailored as to cover only the minimum support of the claimant during
disability. There is nothing to indicate that the framers of the benefit
rates included any padding to take care of legal and other expenses
incurred in obtaining the award.
8 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law sec.
83.11 (1999). Because reducing a worker's award of attorney fees based on
the worker's degree of success is inconsistent with the purposes behind RCW
51.52.130 and the Industrial Insurance Act as a whole. We conclude that
the worker's degree of overall recovery is not a relevant factor in
calculating the attorney fees award.
We also reject the Department's suggestion that the award of attorney fees
should have been limited to those fees attributable to Brand's successful
claims. Relying on Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76
L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983), the Department argues that because Brand's claims were
separate and unrelated, she is entitled to fees on only her successful
claims. The Court of Appeals agreed and specifically directed the trial
court to segregate the costs and fees awarded according to Brand's success
or lack of success on each claim. Brand, 91 Wn. App. at 297.
Hensley was a federal civil rights action brought on behalf of persons
involuntarily confined in a state hospital. The plaintiffs were successful
on one of their three claims, and requested attorney fees as the
"prevailing party" under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988. In Hensley, the United
States Supreme Court held that the extent of the plaintiffs' success was a
"crucial factor" in determining the amount of an attorney fees award.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. The Court concluded that when a plaintiff failed
to prevail on all claims, attorney fees attributable to any unrelated
unsuccessful claims could be excluded from the total fee award. Id. at
435. "Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is
distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the
unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a
reasonable fee." Id. at 440.
This court has followed Hensley and recognized that an award of attorney
fees may be limited to fees attributable to successful claims if the claims
brought are unrelated and separable. Kastanis v. Educational Employees
Credit Union, 122 Wn.2d 483, 859 P.2d 26, 865 P.2d 507 (1994); Nordstrom,
Inc. v. Tampourlos, 107 Wn.2d 735, 733 P.2d 208 (1987). In contrast, when
parties prevail on any significant issue that is inseparable from issues on
which the parties did not prevail, a court may award attorney fees on all
issues. Blair v. Washington State Univ., 108 Wn.2d 558, 740 P.2d 1379
(1987).
The Court in Hensley recognized that attorney fees awards need not be
reduced in all cases in which the plaintiff fails to succeed on each claim
brought:
In other cases the plaintiff's claims for relief will involve a common core
of facts or will be based on related legal theories. Much of counsel's
time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it
difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a
lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. The Court contrasted cases in which the
plaintiffs bring different claims based upon different facts and legal
theories from those cases in which the plaintiffs' claims are related to
the extent that counsel's work on the unsuccessful claims can be deemed to
have been "expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved." Id. at
435 (quoting Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. ¶ 9444, at
5049 (C.D. Cal. 1974)).
We conclude that claims brought under the Industrial Insurance Act are
different from the discrete, unrelated claims at issue in Hensley.
Workers' compensation claims are statutorily based, and deal with one set
of facts and related legal issues. The sole issue on appeal before the
superior or appellate court
in an Industrial Insurance Act case is whether or not the Board adequately
assessed the worker's degree of injury. Alternative theories regarding the
nature and extent of the worker's injury cannot be said to be unrelated,
inseparable claims. An attorney's work on each theory is work "expended in
pursuit of the ultimate result achieved." Id. Claims brought in the
context of the Industrial Insurance Act are distinguishable from claims
brought in the general civil context, which could, as in Hensley, be viewed
as a series of discrete claims.
Given the unitary nature of claims brought under the Industrial Insurance
Act, we hold that workers' compensation claims are not unrelated, and
should not be segregated in terms of successful and unsuccessful claims for
the purpose of calculating attorney fees under RCW 51.52.130. This
conclusion is in accordance with the purpose of RCW 51.52.130 and the
Industrial Insurance Act as a whole.
This is not to say, however, that a worker is entitled to all attorney fees
under all circumstances. RCW 51.52.130 requires, by its plain language,
the award of attorney fees to be reasonable. Furthermore, our holding that
the worker's degree of success does not justify reducing an attorney fees
award does not preclude courts from considering other relevant subjective
factors in calculating the fee award. Courts may still consider subjective
factors such as: the level of skill required by the litigation, the
attorney's reputation, the fee customarily charged for such services, the
time and labor customarily required, duplicative efforts, and time
limitations imposed on the litigation. See generally RPC 1.5(a).
We conclude that the trial court in this case did not err by refusing
to reduce Brand's fee award by those attorney fees attributable to her
unsuccessful claims. However, the trial court failed to enter written
findings or to articulate specific reasons supporting the amount of the
attorney fees award. While the trial judge indicated that he was
"round{ing} off" the attorney fees award, he made no specific findings
regarding what factors justified his decision to round the attorney numbers
up or down. RP (June 21, 1996) at 18. Without such information, we are
unable to determine whether the exercise of the trial court's discretion
was "manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons."
Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y, 114 Wn.2d at 689. We are, therefore,
unable to judge whether the trial court abused its discretion in
calculating Brand's fee award. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court
to make specific findings justifying the fee award in this case.
Finally, Brand contends that she is entitled to an award of attorney
fees on appeal. Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 18.1(a) provides that a
party may recover reasonable attorney fees on review if "applicable law"
grants the party the right to recover such fees. However, RCW 51.52.130
does not grant Brand the right to recover attorney fees in this case. The
case before this court does not involve an appeal in which the Board's
decision is reversed or modified, nor is it a case in which the employer
appealed and the worker's right to "relief" was sustained on appeal. RCW
51.52.130. Accordingly, Brand's request for attorney fees on appeal is
denied.
Conclusion
By the plain language of RCW 51.52.130, a worker who obtains reversal or
modification of the Board's decision and additional relief on appeal is
entitled to an award of attorney fees. Consistent with the plain language
of RCW 51.52.130, its underlying purpose, and the entire Industrial
Insurance Act's statutory scheme, attorney fees awards under RCW 51.52.130
should not be reduced in light of the total benefits obtained by the worker
nor should the attorney fees be limited to fees generated from the worker's
successful claims. While we conclude that the trial court did not err by
refusing to reduce Brand's attorney fees award based upon her degree of
success, the trial court failed to enter specific findings regarding the
basis of its decision. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and
remand to the trial court to award reasonable attorney fees in a manner
consistent with this opinion.
1 WAC 296-20-280 defines eight categories of permanent dorsolumbar and
lumbrosacral impairments. A category one impairment is described as "No
objective clinical findings. Subjective complaints and/or sensory losses
may be present or absent." WAC 296-20-280(1).
2 A category two impairment is described as "{m}ild low back impairment,
with mild intermittent objective clinical findings of such impairment but
no significant x-ray findings and no significant objective motor loss.
Subjective complaints and/or sensory losses may be present." WAC 296-20-
280(2).
3 Ms. Foster's amount was based upon 98.8 hours at $185 per hour, applying
a lodestar of 1.5 because of the significant risk posed by the case.
Foster also requested fees for the additional 14.5 hours spent preparing
the judgment and the memorandum in support of attorney fees.
4 At its inception, the fee-shifting statute in the Industrial Insurance
Act provided that fees were available to either the injured worker or the
employer. See Laws of 1911, ch. 74, sec. 20; Laws of 1931, ch. 90, sec. 1.
In 1951, the Legislature limited the award of attorney fees to make them
available only to the injured workers. Laws of 1951, ch. 225, sec. 17
(codified as RCW 51.52.130).
5 The court may even award fees for the attorney services before the
Department and the Board if the court determines that the fee fixed by the
director or the Board for these services was inadequate. RCW 51.52.130.
TALMADGE, J. (concurring) -- While I concur in the result reached by
the majority, I would adopt instead the well-reasoned opinion of the Court
of Appeals, Division Two, on the award of reasonable attorney fees under
RCW 51.52.130.1
RCW 51.52.130 implicates the term of art "reasonable attorney fee."2
We have indicated in numerous cases that we will employ the lodestar method
to calculate an award of reasonable attorney fees; the lodestar method of
calculating "reasonable attorney fees" is the default principle for fee
calculation in Washington. See, e.g., Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wn.2d 398, 957
P.2d 632, 966 P.2d 305 (1998); Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 122 Wn.2d 141,
859 P.2d 1210 (1993); see, generally, Philip A. Talmadge, Attorney Fees in
Washington: Annotated Statutes, Cases and Commentary at 293-97 (Charles
P. Siner & Cutler and Nylander eds., rev. ed. 1995).
The policy benefits of employing the lodestar method, as discussed by
the Court of Appeals, are apparent. This method, when coupled with trial
court findings of fact and conclusions of law in fee decisions, is a way of
ensuring the trial courts "show their work." A court arrives at a lodestar
award by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate for the prevailing party by
the number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation. See Scott
Fetzer, 122 Wn.2d at 149-50. After the lodestar has been calculated, the
court can adjust the figure, as necessary, to reflect factors not already
taken into account in computing the lodestar. See Bowers v. Transamerica
Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn.2d 581, 593-94, 598, 675 P.2d 193 (1983). Moreover,
since the trial court must limit the lodestar to hours reasonably expended,
it excludes hours spent on "unsuccessful claims, duplicated effort, or
otherwise unproductive time." Bowers, 100 Wn.2d at 597. However, this
method also permits a party to recover fees incurred for unsuccessful
claims if the issues are so intertwined -- both the successful and the
unsuccessful -- that they cannot be easily parsed. Similarly, a party may
seek a multiplier under the lodestar methodology if unusual work is
accomplished or if counsel has taken on a case to the exclusion of other
work in the office. See RPC 1.5(a); see Allard v. First Interstate Bank,
112 Wn.2d 145, 149, 768 P.2d 998, 773 P.2d 420 (1989).
By contrast, in failing to adopt a particular method of calculating
fees, the majority offers no discernible means of determining how a
reasonable fee is present in a particular industrial insurance case. We
are in the business of establishing rules in our case law to govern human
behavior and to guide the operation of our court system. In the absence of
a clear rule by which a trial court can calculate an award of a reasonable
fee, and by which we can
review it, we do a disservice to the public, the trial courts and the Bar
of the State of Washington.
In the present case, the trial court failed to establish an adequate
record upon which to review its fee award; in addition, it did not enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, we do not know which
particular factors, if any, the trial court considered in support of its
reduced fee award. Additionally, we cannot determine if the trial court
thought the attorneys' requested hourly rates were reasonable. Neither do
we know if the hours incurred by both sets of attorneys for the claim in
this case were necessary to the outcome achieved, nor do we know the reason
the trial court declined to award Brand's counsel a multiplier.
In sum, the majority was correct in determining the trial court's
decision on attorney fees should be reversed. Nonetheless, I would adopt
the clear and well-reasoned approach of the Court of Appeals for the
calculation of reasonable attorney fees.
1 RCW 51.52.130 states, in pertinent part: "If, on appeal to the
superior or appellate court from the decision and order of the board, said
decision and order is reversed or modified . . . , a reasonable fee for the
services of the worker's or beneficiary's attorney shall be fixed by the
court." (Emphasis added.)
RCW 51.52.130 is a fee shifting provision, which allows recovery of
fees only in court. See Flanigan v. Department of Labor & Indus., 123
Wn.2d 418, 421, 869 P.2d 14 (1994). Thus, a successful claimant may not
recover attorney fees before the Department of Labor & Industries
(Department) or the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board), where
the overwhelming majority of claims for industrial insurance are resolved.
Contrary to the argument advanced by claimant Brand, RCW 51.52.130 is not
merely designed to guarantee counsel to injured workers. Rather, as part
of the Industrial Insurance Act, the overall purpose of RCW 51.52.130 is to
encourage the finality of matters decided at the Department and Board level
in favor of the injured worker by providing for a shifting of costs in
favor of the injured worker at the trial court level. See Tallerday v.
Delong, 68 Wn. App. 351, 356, 842 P.2d 1023 (1993) (goal of Industrial
Insurance Act is to provide "sure and certain" relief, not to award full
tort damages). If the statute were designed to generally guarantee counsel
to injured workers, the statutory scheme would provide counsel at the
Department and Board level where the vast majority of industrial insurance
matters are actually resolved.
2 See Philip A. Talmadge, The Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil
Litigation in Washington, 16 Gonz. L. Rev. 57, 77 (1980) (Appendix listing
statutes providing for award of reasonable attorney fees).